The Third Term and the Obsession with Staying in Power: What Future for Democracy in Mauritania?

Mohamed Abdarahmane Ould Abdallah
Journalist and Writer — Nouakchott, Mauritania

It is hardly surprising that calls for extending presidential mandates or pursuing a third term periodically resurface. The political experience in Mauritania, as in many countries across the region, shows that the temptation to remain in power tends to grow the longer authority remains in the hands of one individual. Power does not merely entice through influence; it also generates fear — the fear of losing it.
Mauritania’s Constitution established presidential term limits as a safeguard for the peaceful transfer of power, a democratic achievement that was not easily obtained. Yet recurring discussions about amending or circumventing these provisions reveal a deeper flaw in political culture, where the state is often perceived as an extension of the ruler rather than an institution standing above all individuals.
The Shadow of Past Experience
The experience of former President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz continues to shape the political landscape. Having left office after two terms, he later faced complex judicial proceedings, reinforcing a widespread political perception that leaving power may carry risks rather than confer the symbolic status traditionally accorded to former heads of state.
This legacy fuels a legitimate — or sometimes exaggerated — concern for any sitting president: What happens after leaving office? What protections exist? What guarantees are available? In this context, fear of the future can become a powerful incentive to remain in power, even when developmental outcomes do not justify exceptional renewal or extension.
The Democratic Risks of a Third Term
Advocacy for a third presidential term is not merely a technical constitutional amendment; it strikes at the core of democratic governance in several ways:
Undermining peaceful transfer of power
Once term limits become adjustable according to political circumstances, constitutional rules lose their authority and risk becoming instruments of convenience rather than binding principles.
Weakening institutions in favor of personal rule
The longer a leader remains in office, the stronger networks of personal loyalty tend to become, often at the expense of institutional independence — particularly within oversight and judicial bodies whose continuity becomes tied to the ruler’s survival.
Marginalizing emerging elites
Democracy is not only about elections; it is about political opportunity. When pathways to leadership remain closed to younger generations or opposition figures, frustration and exclusion inevitably accumulate.
Distorting development priorities
Instead of focusing on tangible progress in education, healthcare, and employment, political energy shifts toward managing political survival, mobilizing supporters, and securing loyalty.
Between Legitimacy and Performance
In democratic systems, legitimacy derives from respect for constitutional rules rather than dominance over the political arena. When achievements remain modest, attempts to alter the rules of the game may appear as implicit acknowledgment that performance alone cannot secure public consent.
A president confident in his record and in the strength of national institutions does not require an exceptional mandate to preserve his place in history. Conversely, those who fear accountability or uncertainty may view extension as temporary protection — a protection that ultimately weakens the state in the long term.
Democracy Is Not a Luxury
In a country like Mauritania, facing significant economic and social challenges, respecting presidential term limits sends an important message of internal and external reassurance that governance follows institutional norms. Tampering with this principle may produce short-term stability, but it risks reopening the door to personalized rule.
Africa’s political history offers numerous examples of leaders who amended constitutions to remain in power, often resulting in declining public trust, social tension, and weakened state credibility. Democracy, however fragile, remains far less costly than recurring crises of legitimacy.
Ultimately, the real question is not whether the constitution can be amended, but rather: What kind of state do we want?
A state governed by institutions and rules — or one governed by political anxieties and personal ambitions?